Priceless friendship. The Kremlin’s support for Vladimir Putin’s cronies. OSW Point of View 71, November 2018 by Wisniewska, Iwona
7 1
P r i c e l e s s  f r i e n d s h i P
T h e  K r e m l i n ’ s  s u p p o r T  
f o r  V l a d i m i r  p u T i n ’ s  c r o n i e s





thE KREMliN’S SUppoRt  
foR VlAdiMiR pUtiN’S cRoNiES
iwona Wiśniewska
© copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich
im. Marka Karpia / centre for Eastern Studies
content editor
















Wojciech Mańkowski, Maciej Makulski
pUBliShER
Ośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia
centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, poland
phone: + 48 /22/ 525 80 00






I. WEStERN SANctioNS – A BloW to pRESidENt pUtiN’S 
fRiENdS /10
1. The new private oligarchs in Russia  /10
2. Western sanctions against Putin’s friends /16
II. thE oliGARchS’ StRAtEGiES to coUNtERAct thE 
SANctioNS /23
III. thE KREMliN’S SUppoRt foR ENtREpRENEURS UNdER 
SANctioNS  /35
1. Public procurement as the main instrument of support /36
2. Additional financing for infrastructure projects under sanctions /39
3. Support for banks under sanctions  /40
4. Compensatory tax breaks for oligarchs /42
5. Indirect support mechanisms /43
IV. thE coNSEqUENcES of thE SANctioNS foR thE 

















•	 When	 the	Kremlin	decided	 to	attack	Ukraine,	 it	put	 its	geo-
political	objectives	above	the	economic	interests	of	Russia	and	
Russian	 business.	That	 decision	 engendered	major	 financial	







•	 The	 personal	 sanctions	 imposed	 after	 2014	 by	 the	 United	













a	 life	of	 luxury	outside	Russia	and	had	 to	 restrict	 their	con-
tacts	with	the	international	elite.	The	sanctions	thus	became	
a	test	of	the	Russian	elite’s	loyalty	to	Vladimir	Putin.
•	 The	Kremlin	made	 its	first	efforts	 to	at	 least	partly	compen-
sate	a	 select	group	of	businessmen	 for	 the	 losses	 suffered	as	
a	result	of	the	sanctions	as	early	as	March	2014.	The	Russian	
state	apparatus	pursued	a	co-ordinated	policy	of	 supporting	

























jurisdiction,	making	 the	 oligarchs	 even	more	 dependent	 on	
the	Kremlin.
•	 The	 sanctions	have	 limited	Russian	business’s	 opportunities	
to	expand	internationally,	while	the	prospects	for	the	Russian	
economy’s	growth	in	the	coming	years	are	not	particularly	op-





































































































































i. WEstErn sanctions – a bloW 
to PrEsidEnt Putin’s friEnds





ance	 has	 become	 increasingly	 centralised,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 which	





to	 strengthen	 the	 Kremlin’s	 control	 over	 private	 business.	The	
Yukos	case	was	a	turning	point	for	the	efficacy	of	that	process,4	
as	it	was	the	moment	where	the	Kremlin	displayed	the	tools	and	
mechanisms	 through	which	 it	would	control	 the	private	 sector,	
such	 as	 the	 full	 pliancy	 of	 state	 institutions.	The	 end	 of	 Putin’s	
first	term	and	the	beginning	of	the	second	in	particular	marked	
a	period	when	many	private	entrepreneurs	lost	their	businesses	
and	moved	abroad.	 In	 the	aftermath,	big	business	 in	Russia	be-
came	fully	subordinated	to	the	Kremlin.	The	Russian	leadership	
also	 imposed	new	conditions	 for	 its	co-operation	with	business:	
businessmen	 are	 banned	 from	 ‘meddling’	 with	 political	 affairs	
and	have	 to	 share	 their	profits	as	part	of	 their	 ‘corporate	 social	
responsibility’,	for	instance	by	supporting	the	implementation	of	
3	 See	 the	 Federal	Anti-Monopoly	 Service	 of	 the	Russian	Federation,	 2016,	





















However,	 against	 the	backdrop	of	 those	general	 trends,	 a	 small	
group	 of	 new	 private	 oligarchs	 has	 emerged	 in	 Russia,	 whose	
wealth	 has	 grown	 dynamically	 under	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	 rule.	 In	
particular,	this	group	includes	four	men	with	whom	Putin	built	
close	 relations	 back	 in	 St.	 Petersburg:	 Gennady	 Timchenko,	
Arkady	and	Boris	Rotenberg,	and	Yuri	Kovalchuk5	 (see	Figure	1	
ona	page	15	for	more	information).	
Yuri	Kovalchuk	 is	 the	man	who	created	an	elite	 summer	house	
co-operative	on	Lake	Komsomolskoye	in	the	1990s,	together	with	
Putin	and	a	group	of	friends	from	St.	Petersburg	(which	also	in-








President	 Putin	 reaffirmed	 his	 close	 acquaintance,	 and	 even	
friendly	 relations	 with	 Timchenko,	 Kovalchuk	 and	 the	 Roten-
bergs	during	his	2014	televised	conference	with	the	public,	when	
he	was	asked	about	 the	Western	 sanctions.	He	 said:	 “Yes,	 these	




























est	among	 them,	has	been	 the	most	 successful	 (in	2018,	accord-
ing	to	Forbes,	his	assets	were	worth	an	estimated	US$16.8	billion).	
His	 company	Gunvor	 accounted	 for	 as	much	 as	 40%	 of	 Russia’s	













of	 their	 capital	 from	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	Russia,	where	property	
rights	are	not	respected.	However,	there	is	very	limited	informa-
tion	 available	 on	 the	 volume	 of	 capital	 expatriated	 from	Russia	
by	 specific	 entrepreneurs.	 Many	 such	 operations	 were	 carried	



























intermediaries.8	The	 scale	 of	 the	 phenomenon	was	 revealed	 by	
a	journalistic	investigation	which	looked	into	confidential	docu-













The	 fact	 that	 Timchenko,	 the	 Rotenbergs	 and	 Kovalchuk	 have	
been	able	to	build	up	their	private	business	empires	proves	that	
they	occupy	strong	positions	within	the	Putinist	power	elite.	That	
elite	 consists	 of	 Putin’s	 close	 aides	 in	 the	 state	 administration,	
business	and	the	defence	and	security	sectors,	most	of	whom	hail	
from	St.	Petersburg	and	hold	significant	sway	over	Russia’s	poli-
cy.11	 Significantly,	 the	 group	 is	 covert	 and	 informal,	with	many	




























of	 its	members	holding	no	public	 functions.	The	Putinist	 estab-
lishment	is	not	homogenous,	and	tensions	and	divisions	exist	be-
tween	different	 interest	groups.	These	conflicts	mainly	concern	

















in	 the	 years	 1975–1990,	 and	 in	 the	 St.	 Petersburg	City	Hall	 in	 the	 years	












































Figure 1. Assets of selected Russian businesspeople according to 
















source: Forbes 2017, http://www.forbes.ru/rating/342579-200-bogateyshih-
biznesmenov-rossii-2017
* 2018 figures as of 6 June; figures for the remaining years as of February/
March. As a result of the new sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States 
on 6 April 2018, the stock-exchange value of the companies owned by the en-
trepreneurs has declined, although in recent weeks the companies have been 
recovering. For instance, in March 2018, Forbes estimated the wealth of the 
Rotenberg family at US$5.45 billion. 
















2. Western sanctions against Putin’s friends
The	United	States	has	imposed	more	painful	restrictions	on	Russia	
than	any	other	Western	state,	putting	the	largest	number	of	Rus-
sian	 nationals	 and	 their	 companies	 under	 restrictions.	 Gennady	
Timchenko,	 Yuri	 Kovalchuk	 and	 the	 brothers	 Arkady	 and	 Boris	
Rotenberg	were	put	on	the	US	sanctions	list	as	soon	as	20	March	
2014.14	 All	 their	 assets	 in	 the	United	 States	were	 frozen,	 and	US	
companies	and	companies	doing	business	in	the	United	States	were	
prohibited	 from	entering	any	transactions	with	 those	persons	or	











































Timchenko,	 who	 held	 extensive	 assets	 outside	 Russia,	 was	 the	
most	 exposed	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 sanctions.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	
Rotenberg	 brothers	 and	Kovalchuk,	 the	 sanctions	were	 painful	
because	the	banks	they	controlled	were	dependent	on	the	inter-
national	financial	markets	and	Western	technologies.	In	addition	













































fields	with	China.	However,	 as	 the	prices	 of	 oil,	 and	hence	 also	
export	 revenues,	 increased	again,	most	of	 the	projects	were	 re-
sumed.








as	well	 as	Transoil,	 the	 rail	 company	 servicing	mainly	 the	Ust-




































shielded	 them	from	the	US	sanctions,	 so	 they	could	continue	 to	








States,	 the	 sanctions	hit	 the	 SMP	Bank	 (one	 of	Russia’s	 top	 thirty	
banks	in	terms	of	assets)	which	they	own.	When	the	first	sanctions	
were	imposed	on	Russia	and	on	the	Rotenbergs	personally	(in	March	
2014),	 the	Bank,	 even	 though	 it	was	not	 sanctioned	 itself,	 stopped	
































roubles	 (US$1.5	 billion).21	 The	 Owental	 Stock	 Investments	 hedge	
fund	registered	 in	Cyprus,	which	had	 links	to	the	Rotenbergs	(ac-






formerly	 owned	 by	 the	 Cypriot	 company	 Olpon	 Investments	 Ltd.	
US	 sanctions	 were	 also	 imposed	 on	 the	 Rotenbergs’	 Stroygaz-




mainly	 operate	 on	 the	 Russian	market,	 the	 sanctions	 deprived	
them	 of	 access	 to	 technology,	 which	made	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	
them	 to	 implement	 their	 projects.	 Because	 of	 the	 sanctions,	 no	
Western	financial	institutions	agreed	to	insure	the	construction	















24	 For	more	information,	see	Турецкий сухогруз снес опоры строящегося мос­











































25	 For	more	information,	see	Dutch companies investigated for supplying equipment 






















ing	registered	 in	 the	United	States.	As	a	result	of	 the	sanctions,	





























ii. thE oligarchs’ stratEgiEs 
to countEract thE sanctions
The	 Russian	 oligarchs	 have	 largely	 managed	 to	 minimise	 the	
damage	and	protect	 their	 assets	 from	 the	 impact	 of	 sanctions.	
They	 have	 done	 so	 by	 using	 various	 financial	 mechanisms	 to	
prevent	the	freezing	of	assets,	which	has	allowed	them	to	con-
tinue	 doing	 business.	The	mechanisms	 they	 used	 have	 proven	
quite	effective,	because	most	of	the	assets	of	the	entrepreneurs	















has	 tried	 to	 tighten	 and	 extend	 the	 sanctions	 lists.	 As	 a	 result,	
over	the	last	four	years	sanctions	have	been	extended	to	the	sons	











































































































































• Arena Event Oy (49.5%)
• Rossiya Bank (10%)
• Sibur (15%) 
• Stroytransgaz,
construction company (63%)
• Stroytransneftgaz (around 50%)
• Yuzhnye Zemli,
fruit producer (35%) 
• Novatek,
gas holding (23%)





transport company (89%) 
• Alma, agri-food business
– apple producer (40%)
• Transoil,
rail cargo company (80%)
• Sovag, insurance
company (24.8%)- Hartwall Arena Helsinki (100%)
















December 2015 Volga Group removed from
registers in tax havens and registered in Russia
Volga Group currently manages






















Foreign assets sold by Timchenko
shortly before the imposition of US sanctions
Foreign assets held by Timchenko
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Foreign assets sold by Timchenko
shortly before the imposition of US sanctions
Foreign assets held by Timchenko
























acquired	 by	 the	Russian	 billionaire	 Petr	Kolbin.	 Timchenko	
also	reduced	his	stake	in	Arena	Events	Oy	(the	owner	of	the	




the	US	government	as	 attempts	 at	 circumventing	 sanctions,	












more	information,	see	Volga Group Геннадия Тимченко 19 марта продала 































In	 parallel	 to	 Timchenko’s	 actions	 refocusing	 his	 business	
on	 the	Russian	market,	Gunvor	 took	 steps	 to	 severe	 ties	not	
only	with	Timchenko	but	also	with	Russia	 in	order	 to	avoid	
being	exposed	 to	 the	US	sanctions.	The	Swiss	oil	 trader	sold	
its	 shares	 in	 Russian	 companies	 to	 Gazprombank32	 and	 the	






31	 For	more	 information,	 see	 Р.	Шлейнов,	 ‘Акции	СОГАЗа	достались	 дочке’,	










как	 «Усть-Луга	 Ойл»	 за	 3	 года	 увеличила	 выручку	 вчетверо’,	 РБК,	
7	December	2015,	http://www.rbc.ru/ins/business/07/12/2015/565f4f6e9a7
947084d937c79

















As	 he	 put	 his	 assets	 under	 Russian	 jurisdiction,	 Gennady	
Timchenko	and	his	wife	also	moved	to	Russia	and	stopped	us-
ing	their	foreign	properties.35	Since	2014,	Timchenko	has	os-
tentatiously	 remained	 in	Russia.	Most	 of	 these	 actions	have	
been	preventative	 in	nature;	Timchenko	was	not	put	on	 the	
EU	 sanctions	 list,	 and	 is	 able	 to	 continue	 doing	 business	 in	
Europe.	His	 decisions	were	 probably	motivated	 by	 concerns	























galleries/140737489132611/normal/2	 and	 Alexey	 Navalny’s	 investigative	
















































































ASSETS OF THE ROTENBERG BROTHERS
– EVERYTHING STAYS WITHIN THE FAMILY
Stroygazmontazh 
July 2014 the company
was removed from
registers in Cyprus
and registered in Russia
December 2014 Arkady bought 17%
of shares in Stroygazmontazh from Boris




brothers’ SMP Bank Russia 
In May 2014, SMP Bank Latvia
was sold to its managers
and renamed
as Meridian Trade Bank











– the Långvik conference centre
and hotel near Helsinki (100%)
– the Tanskarlan Centrum developer (100%)
– Arena Event Oy (50%)*
[owner of the Hartwall Arena Helsinki
and 49% of shares in the Jokerit Hockey Club (KHL)]
October 2015 Roman Rotenberg,
son of Boris, took over 100%
of shares in Långvik Capital Ltd





















with	 the	West	and	allow	the	businesses	 they	sold	 to	operate	















The	 Russian	 media	 has	 also	 demonstrated	 that	 despite	 the	
sanctions	(imposed	by	both	the	EU	and	the	US	in	the	case	of	
Arkady),	the	Rotenberg	brothers	have	found	a	way	to	contin-
ue	 doing	 business	 abroad	 with	 trusted	 long-time	 managers	
of	SMP	Bank	acting	on	their	behalf.	The	authors	of	the	anti-






38	 The	munscanner.com	 portal	was	 founded	 in	2014	with	 the	 support	 of	Bo-




































became	 a	 shareholder	 in	 the	 family	 businesses.	(For	 more	
information	 about	 the	 transactions,	 see	 Diagrams	 on	 pages	
29	and	32).
cians	 in	 Russia.	 For	 more	 information,	 see	 Аркадий Ротенберг: Кипр 
наш!,	11	April	2017,	https://munscanner.com/2017/04/kinasis-llc/	and	Как 








































over 94.2% of Mostotrest
March 2018 (shortly before Igor
has been put under US sanctions)
shares taken over by Igor’s sister
Lilia Rotenberg
December 2017
Gazprom bureniye removed from
registers in Cyprus and Saint Lucia,




33.3% in TPS Real Estate
October 2014
78.7% in Gazprom bureniye






















Igor Rotenberg, son of Arkady

























tions	 resulting	 in	 sanctions	being	 lifted	 from	some	assets	of	
Rossiya	Bank.	When	he	sold	the	Cypriot	Telcrest	company	to	
the	 Russian	 billionaire	 Alexey	 Mordashov	 and	 the	 Russian	





ministration,	 as	 a	 result	 of	which	 the	 sanctions	 list	was	 ex-
panded	in	2016	to	include	companies	and	persons	associated	
with	 Bank	 Rossiya	 (e.g.	 ABR	 Management	 and	 its	 director	



































Rossiya Bank’s chief shareholders
YURI KOVALCHUK’S FINANCIAL OPERATIONS
US sanctions, March 2014
EU sanctions, July 2014
Yuri Kovalchuk (37.5%)
EU sanctions, July 2014
Nikolai Shamalov (9.6%)
Rossiya Bank sells some shares controlled by the Abros* investment company
* September 2014 Rossiya Bank transfers control of Abros to the company’s management
Telcrest (54.9%)
owns 25% in CTC Media
In September 2015 Abros sold
27.9% of shares in Telcrest
to Aleksei Mordashov
and the state-owned VTB
** Until autumn 2014, Gennady Timchenko had held a 12.5% stake in Sogaz,
    which he subsequently sold to his daughter Ksenia Frank
Sogaz – insurance company**
(51%)
 
In March 2014 Abros sold
2.5% of shares in Sogaz
In July 2014 Abros sold 16% of shares
in Sogaz to a Gazprom subsidiary
The remaining 32.5% of Sogaz shares
owned by Abros were taken over in 2016
by Akvila, a company owned
by Bolshoy Dom 9, a company
named after the registration address
of Rossiya Bank and controlled
by Yuri Kovalchuk and his wife




















iii. thE KrEmlin’s suPPort for 
EntrEPrEnEurs undEr sanctions 
Irrespective	 of	 their	 personal	 damage-control	 strategies,	 the	








Russia’s	 actions	 towards	Ukraine,	 it	was	 clear	 that	 the	 Russian	
economy	and	the	oligarchs	personally	would	bear	the	cost	of	those	
































1. Public procurement as the main instrument of support
Public	contracts	have	been	the	main	instrument	deployed	by	the	
Russian	government	to	support	the	businessmen	affected	by	the	
Western	 sanctions.	 Goods,	 services	 and	 works	 ordered	 by	 the	
state,	 local	 and	 regional	 governments	 and	 state-owned	 compa-
nies	in	2017	were	worth	a	total	of	36.5	trillion	roubles	(more	than	
US$626	 billion),	 accounting	 for	 nearly	 40%	 of	 GDP.	 Despite	 the	
crisis,	the	Russian	federal	budget	and	the	regional	budgets	tried	












among	the	Russian	state	companies  in	2017	 (7.8	 trillion	roubles,	
i.e.	US$134	billion).44	Gazprom	has	also	 systematically	appeared	
among	 the	 largest	 buyers	 in	 recent	 years.45	 However,	 it	 should	








Мониторинг применения федерального закона от 18 июля 2011 г. № 223­фз 


























information	 on	 their	 business	 partners	 (suppliers,	 contractors,	
etc.)	until	1	July	2018.46	




show	 that	 companies	 linked	 to	 these	 two	men	have	been	major	
beneficiaries	 of	 public	 investments	 in	Russia.	 Forbes	 estimates,	









































roubles,	 i.e.	 around	US$300	million).	 Reports	 that	 entities	 con-
trolled	by	Gennady	Timchenko	and	Arkady	Rotenberg	were	the	








































Figure 2. ‘Kings of Government Procurements’















of	 the	 international	 sanctions.	 However,	 that	 instrument	 has	































financing	 and	 faced	 problems	with	 building	 the	 coal	 reloading	
terminal	at	the	port	of	Vanino	in	Yakutia.

















cable	 to	 Bank	 Rossiya	 and	 SMP	 Bank,	 including	 requirements	
concerning	ratings,	so	that	Russian	pension	funds	could	deposit	
their	monies	with	the	banks.51










information,	 see	ЦБ облегчил доступ к пенсионным деньгам для банков, 


















mal	 recommendation	 to	 state-owned	 enterprises	 to	move	 their	
financial	accounts	to	the	two	banks.	As	a	result,	in	the	following	







approved	 a	 modification	 of	 the	 tender	 conditions	 under	 which	
the	banks’	original	pre-sanction	ratings	had	been	taken	into	ac-













































foreign-issued	 cards	 in	 internal	 Russian	 transactions.	 Moreo-






4. Compensatory tax breaks for oligarchs
For	 those	 entrepreneurs	 from	 the	 president’s	 inner	 circle	 who	
faced	individual	sanctions	and	restrictions	on	travel,	it	was	par-
ticularly	important	to	be	exempted	from	taxes	in	Russia.	The	law	






































ing	 to	 show	that	 they	actually	paid	any	 taxes,	which	 facilitated	
abuse	and	effectively	enabled	the	beneficiaries	of	the	 law	not	to	





5. Indirect support mechanisms
The	 National	 Media	 Group	 (NMG)	 holding,	 controlled	 by	 Koval-
chuk	via	Rossiya	Bank57,	became	one	of	the	main	beneficiaries	of	
new	 regulations	 concerning	 the	Russian	media	 sector,	 including	
the	2014	bill	which	required	foreign	investors	to	scale	down	their	
stakes	 in	media	 companies	 in	Russia	 to	 20%.	NMG	exploited	 the	



























































iv. thE consEquEncEs of thE sanctions 
for thE PrEsidEnt’s innEr circlE and 











Because	 of	 the	 sanctions,	 these	 entrepreneurs	 have	 had	 to	 scale	
down	 their	 foreign	 operations	 and	 put	 them	 under	 Russian	 ju-
risdiction.	 The	 men	 themselves	 and	 their	 assets	 became	 ‘toxic’,	










However,	 the	 financial	 operations	which	 the	 Russian	 oligarchs	
have	 undertaken	 have	 been	 successful	 in	 minimising	 losses	
abroad:	they	have	managed	to	avoid	freezes	on	most	of	their	as-
sets,	 or	 have	 succeeded	 in	 getting	 the	 restrictions	 lifted	 quite	
quickly.	The	 fact	 that	 the	 four	 men’s	 wealth	 was	 concentrated	
in	 Europe	was	 crucial	 for	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 losses	 they	 suffered.	
























Kremlin	 elite	 and	 most	 probably	 responsible	 for	 the	 personal	
wealth	 of	 the	 president	 and	 his	 relatives,	 the	 Kremlin	 became	




of	state	policy	 for	 the	 last	 four	years.	The	public	administration	
and	 the	 legislature	 became	 involved	 by	 enacting	 the	 necessary	
ordinances	and	laws,	while	the	state-owned	companies	did	their	
share	 by	 taking	 advantage	 of	 government	 contracts.	 Ambitious	





most	 completely	 excluded.	Moreover,	 the	 oligarchs	under	 sanc-
tions	were	granted	tax	exemptions	in	Russia,	in	return	for	which	
they	were	expected	to	participate	 in	projects	of	key	 importance	
























a	 case	 in	point.	Despite	 the	 large	 scale	 of	 the	 carriers’	 protests,	
the	government	proceeded	to	carry	out	its	plans,	which	revealed	




the	Kremlin’s	 general	 support,	 the	wealth	of	 the	Russian	presi-
dent’s	insiders	has	been	growing	in	recent	years,	while	a	good	part	
of	that	wealth	is	now	concentrated	in	Russia.	According	to	Forbes	
rankings	 based	 on	 official	 figures	 concerning	 the	 assets	 of	 the	
two	hundred	wealthiest	Russians,	Gennady	Timchenko’s	wealth	







































control	 of	Russian	Railways,	 the	 state-owned	enterprise	he	had	
been	managing	for	the	last	ten	years,	in	unclear	circumstances	in	
mid-2015.61	
The	 support	 that	 oligarchs	 from	 Putin’s	 inner	 circle	 received	
in	 the	first	 years	 after	 the	 imposition	of	 the	first	wave	of	 sanc-
tions	stands	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	rather	restrained	reactions	























owned	Promsvyazbank	to	repay	his	debt	 to	 foreign	banks	and	avoid	 los-






















of	 the	 Russian	 elite,	 including	 flows	 between	 private	 entrepre-
neurs	 and	 state-owned	 companies	 (such	 as	Gazprom	and	VTB),	
which	occurred	in	the	aftermath	of	the	sanctions	and	the	meas-


















anoid	 fear	 of	 an	 external,	Western	 threat	 to	 its	 grip	 on	 power.	
This	attitude	has	manifested	itself	in	the	ban	on	agricultural	and	
food	imports	from	the	West	and	the	policy	of	import	substitution,	



















































































sia,	as	well	as	Moscow’s	responses	so	 far,	 it	seems	 likely	that	 in	
the	immediate	future,	the	Kremlin	will	continue	making	efforts	
to	 prevent	 the	 synchronisation	 of	 the	 European	 and	 American	
sanctions	policies	 towards	Russia.	Moscow	will	demonstrate	 its	


































in	 distress	 (the	 US	 sanctions	 list	 includes	 around	 100	 Russian	










The	 limited	 opportunities	 for	 foreign	 expansion	 that	 Russian	
businesses	have,	combined	with	a	further	tightening	of	sanctions	
against	the	oligarchs,	may	trigger	a	mounting	rivalry	among	the	
members	of	the	Russian	elite	over	the	available	business	assets,	
with	the	group	of	potential	beneficiaries	becoming	ever	narrower.
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